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THE MALPRACTICE OF HEALTH CARE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Pamela Kohlman Webster*
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress and special interest groups view the Bankruptcy Code
the way graffiti artists view a freshly painted wall: neither Congress
nor the artist can resist the urge to leave an imprint. Since its enact-
ment in 1978, and despite the years of study and commentary that
accompanied its development, the Bankruptcy Code' , has been fre-
quently and markedly amended by succeeding Congresses.2 Each
amendment created preferences for particular creditors, or limited the
options for a particular type of debtor. As with graffiti, whether
these additions have enhanced or defaced the Code is subject to con-
siderable debate.
In spite of the stunning failure of the 105th Congress to pass
bankruptcy reform legislation prior to its adjournment,3 the 106th
* J.D. 1982, University of California at Davis; Shareholder, Buchalter,
Nemer, Fields & Younger, A Professional Corporation; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 1996-1998.
1. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.).
2. Some of the more extensive bills have been the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1984
Amendments]; the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3105 (codified
at 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394 §§ 601-702, 108 Stat. 4147 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
101 (1994)). A list of all federal laws relating to bankruptcy enacted after the
Bankruptcy Code through 1994 can be found in Charles Jordan Tabb, The
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 5, 37 n.266 (1995).
3. On September 23, 1998, the Senate passed Senate Bill 1301, the Con-
sumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, by a vote of 97-1, a remarkable feat in
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Congress has already initiated several attempts to change the Code.
This Article examines the recent and future foreseeable efforts to af-
fect health care reform by amending the Bankruptcy Code, and to
otherwise affect health care related cases pending under the Code.
As discussed below, these efforts are unwise. First, the legislation is
poorly drafted and would result in serious unintended consequences.
Second, there is no justification for elevating claims of the federal
government over the claims of other unsecured creditors. Third, the
legislatures' creation of additional duties on bankruptcy trustees ap-
pointed in health care bankruptcy cases imposes an unfair burden
upon them and an economic penalty on all creditors. The only sensi-
ble solution is to require more of the regulators who have the neces-
sary expertise and ability to widely spread the cost.
II. THE BALKANIZATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it did not create a
law free from special interest considerations or quirky, industry-
specific provisions. Special stockbroker and commodity broker liq-
uidations4 and railroad reorganizations 5 existed. The law has always
given beneficial treatment to certain categories of creditors to the ex-
clusion of others equally worthy. Even as enacted, § 507 provided
six types of creditors a priority in payment.6 Section 362 allowed
eight exemptions to the automatic stay,7 and § 523 carved nine types
of claims from its discharge provisions.
8
Over the last twenty years, there has been a steady stream of
changes to the Code. These changes have added or broadened pro-
visions favoring a particular group of creditors or burdening, or more
rarely benefiting, debtors in a particular industry. Chapter 12 is per-
haps the greatest example of how the Code alterations have affected
a particular industry.9 Section 365 now contains multiple examples
a Congress not particularly well known for its bipartisan spirit. See 144 CONG.
REC. S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998). Despite this lopsided vote, Congress
adjourned in October without sending the bill to the President.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-752, 761-766 (1994).
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174 (1995 & Supp. 111997 & Supp. III 1998).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
7. See id. § 362(b).
8. See id. § 523.
9. See id. §§ 1201-08, 1221-31.
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of creditor favoritism. 10 Section 507's priority classes have grown to
nine to include grain growers, fishermen," and recipients of alimony
and child support.12 Each of Section 523's exceptions to discharge
and Section 362's exceptions to the automatic stay have grown to
eighteen. 13 At times, Congress has simply added whole sections to
the Code in -order to benefit an insular group of politically active
creditors. Examples include § 1113,14 which creates considerable
roadblocks to an employer's ability to reject a collective bargaining
agreement, 5 and § 1114,16 which makes it extremely difficult to
modify a retiree's benefits in a Chapter 11 case.
17
III. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY AND BANKRUPTCY CODE
"REVORM".
Recent efforts to affect health care related bankruptcy cases
have only perpetuated the rending pattern of the last twenty years.
These efforts fall into the same two broad types found in earlier
amendments: Those changes that attempt to negate the impact of
health care related bankruptcy cases on particular creditors, in this
instance the federal government, and those that impact how a health
care concern in bankruptcy is liquidated or reorganized. Each type is
discussed and separately criticized below.
A. The Government Protecting the Government
Under the Social Security Act,18 qualified health care providers
receive periodic estimated payments for covered Medicare and
10. See id. § 365. Since creating the Section, Congress has changed it at
the behest of real and personal property lessors-particularly shopping center
lessors-intellectual property licensees, airport operators, and timeshare inter-
est buyers.
11. But only if they are United States fishermen. See 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(5)(B).
12. See id. § 507(a)(7).
13. See id. §§ 523(a), 362(b).
14. Section 1113 was added as part of the 1984 Amendments. See 11
U.S.C. § 1113 (1984), 98 Stat. 390 (July 10, 1984).
15. See id.
16. Section 1114 was added as part of Act of Nov. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-334, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 610 (June 16, 1988).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
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Medicaid services from the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices ("HHS").19 Annually, HHS reconciles the total amounts paid
with the proper amounts due and compensates the provider for any
previous underpayment.20 Any overpayments are recovered through
deductions from future reimbursements. 21 HHS can also suspend
payments if it believes that the provider has committed fraud or will-
ful misrepresentation, has failed to file reports, or otherwise has
failed to meet the proper standard of care established for Medicare
providers.
22
Many health care providers' daily operations are dependent
upon Medicare or Medicaid funding. Any interruption in the flow of
funds, therefore, can precipitate a financial crisis and force a bank-
ruptcy filing.23 The bankruptcy filing raises concerns that HHS will
not be able to recover the overpayment because of the automatic
stay24 or may have to give back what it recovered as a preference.
2 5
Although the early days of the 106th Congress were not note-
worthy for the attention given to legislative matters, Congress at least
gave some attention to making the overpayment claims less of a con-
cern to the government in the event of a bankruptcy filing by the
provider. On January 20, 1999, Senator Charles Grassley,26 who fre-
quently sponsors bankruptcy legislation, and Senator John Breaux,
27
who is active in health care issues, introduced Senate Bill 255, the
"Home Health Integrity Preservation Act of 1999.,,28 Although
Senate Bill 255 does not primarily focus on bankruptcy, 2 9 bankruptcy
19. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.64(b) (1997).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (1994).
21. See 42 C.F.R. § 413.64(f) (1997).
22. See id.
23. See Samuel R. Maizel & Judith A. Waltz, Injunctive Relief in Health
Care Insolvencies, 24 CAL. BANKR. J. 215 (1998).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). The automatic stay is an injunction that
arises immediately upon the commencement of the bankruptcy case. It pro-
hibits a wide range of activity to collect pre-bankruptcy debts or to assert or
enforce claims against the debtor's property.
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994). Section 547 permits the avoidance of
transfers made in the ninety days--or, in the case of insiders, one year-before
bankruptcy that gives the creditor an advantage. See id.
26. Charles Grassley is a Republican Senator from Iowa.
27. John Breaux is a Democratic Senator from Louisiana.
28. S. 255, 106th Cong. (1999).
29. The bill purports "[tjo combat waste, fraud, and abuse in payments for
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is at least on the sponsors' minds. In his remarks, Senator G-rassley
stated that the purpose of the Act is "to make it harder for all Medi-
care providers, not just home health agencies, to avoid penalties and
repayment obligations by declaring bankruptcy."
30
Senate Bill 255 impacts a bankruptcy case in three significant
ways.31 First, it exempts from the automatic stay "any action against
a [Medicare provider], including any action or proceeding to exclude
or suspend such debtor from program participation, assess civil
monetary penalties, recoup or set off overpayments, or deny or sus-
pend payment of claims." 32 Second, it makes an obligation on ac-
count of a Medicare overpayment and related penalties, fines, and as-
sessments non-dischargeable. 33 Finally, it makes unavoidable any
otherwise preferential payments made by a Medicare provider.
34
Among its other problems, and despite the significance of these
changes to the Bankruptcy Code, Senate Bill 255 does not actually
seek to amend the Code itself. Instead, these special provisions are
to be added to Titles XI and XVIII of the Social Security Act.
35
home health services provided under the Medicare program, and to improve
the quality of those home health services." Id.
30. 145 CONG. REc. S750, S756 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
31. The bill's bankruptcy provisions are similar to those proposed in the
Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Abuse, and Waste Prevention Amendments of
1997, proposed by the Clinton Administration, and the Medicare Fraud and
Overpayment Act introduced in 1998 in the House as House Bill 3471 and in
the Senate as Senate Bill 1788. Neither was enacted. See H.R. 1770, 105th
Cong. (1997); H.R. 3471, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1788, 105th Cong. (1998).
32. S. 255, 106th Cong. § 9(a) (1999). One can only hope that the "any ac-
tion" language will be clarified in the legislative process. As written, it elimi-
nates entirely the automatic stay against any creditor action in a health care re-
lated bankruptcy case.
33. See id. § 9(b).
34. See id. § 9(c). Although Senate Bill 255 does not make a claim arising
from a Medicare overpayment a priority claim under Section 507, such an ef-
fort is anticipated. Making the claim non-dischargeable is meaningless in most
health care cases since few with significant Medicare overpayment claims are
operated as sole proprietorships, and only individuals are entitled to a dis-
charge.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1320c-22, 1395-1395ccc (1994).
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B. Restrictions on Health Care Debtors and Trustees
Senate Bill 62536 provides the best example of a legislative pro-
posal that seeks to create special operational rules in a health care
provider's bankruptcy case. Senate Bill 625, introduced on March
16, 1999, by Senator Grassley is entitled the "Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1999."01 Although Senate Bill 625 has many provisions,
38
health care provisions occupy one of its thirteen titles. If enacted, the
bill will make health care a unique type of bankruptcy case.
Senate Bill 625 first defines a health care business as any profit
or non profit public or private entity, that is primarily engaged in of-
fering to the general public facilities and services for the diagnosis of
injury, deformity, or disease, or provide surgical, drug treatments,
psychiatric or obstetric care.39 These facilities specifically include a
hospital, hospice, health miaintenance organization, long-term facility
or home for the aged. Other defined terms included health mainte-
nance organizations, patients, and patient's records.
4 0
Section 1102 of the Bill would add a new section 351 to the
Bankruptcy Code that would contain specific provisions for the dis-
posal of patient records in a bankruptcy case. Generally, if the es-
tate lacks sufficient funds to pay for the storage of patient records,
the bill obligates the trustee to request permission to deposit the rec-
ords with the "appropriate" federal or state agency.42 If the govern-
ment or agency refuses or fails to respond withii sixty days, then the
trustee is obligated to publish a notice in the "appropriate" newspa-
per that the records will be destroyed if not claimed by the patient's
36. S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill's provisions are similar to those
proposed in the "Business Bankruptcy Reform Act," which Senator Grassley
proposed in the 105th Congress as Senate Bill 1914.
37. See id. §1(a).
38. Among other things, Senate Bill 625 limits consumer access to Chapter
7 bankruptcy cases and provides for a special small business bankruptcy case;
adds a Chapter 6 to the Bankruptcy Code to govern ancillary and cross-border
bankruptcy cases; modifies or adds provisions dealing with financial instru-
ments such as forward contracts and swap agreements; and addresses various
bankruptcy tax issues. See S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999).
39. See id. § I101(a).
40. Seeid. § 1101(b)-(d).
41. See id. § 1102(a).
42. See id.
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insurance provider.43 In addition, the trustee is required to attempt to
notify each patient directly.44 If there is still no response, the trustee
is required to shred, bum, or otherwise destroy the records.
45
Section 1103 of the Bill would modify § 503(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to add, as a new administrative expense, the actual and
necessary costs and expenses of closing a health care business in-
cluding the required manner of disposing of patient records and
transferring patients.
46
Section 1104 of the Bill would add a new section 332 to the
Bankruptcy Code, which would require the appointment of an om-
budsman within thirty days of the commencement of any health care
bankruptcy case to act as a patient advocate.47 The duties of such an
ombudsman would be to monitor the quality of patient care and re-
port to the court not later than every sixty days regarding the quality
of patient care. If the ombudsman believes that the quality of patient
care is declining significantly or is otherwise being materially com-
promised, he or she must report to the court immediately upon mak-
ing that determination. Compensation of the ombudsman is to be at
the expense of the estate.
48
Finally, Section 1105 of the Bill would add to the duties of a
trustee a requirement that he or she use all "reasonable and best ef-
forts" to transfer patients from the health care business debtor being
closed, to a health care business or other entity in the same general
vicinity that provides substantially similar services and maintains a
reasonable quality of care.
49
Less recently, on February 2, 1999, Representative Mike Bili-
rakis ° introduced the "Patient Protection Act of 1999," which has-
been numbered House Bill 448.51 Like Senate-Bill 625, House Bill
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. § 1103.
47. See id. §1104.
48. See id.
49. See id. § 1105.
50. Mike Bilirakis is a Republican Representative from Florida.
51. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999).
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448 deals with a number of other matters, although, unlike Senate
Bill 625, they are all at least related to health care.
52
Section 81053 of House Bill 448 includes language that would
allow the Secretary of HIHS to petition the district court to be named
trustee of an insolvent group health plan for the duration of the insol-
vency if the plan is "unable to provide benefits when due or is oth-
erwise in a financially hazardous condition."54 The application may
be filed by the Secretary notwithstanding any pending bankruptcy
petitions and the existence of the automatic stay.55 In fact, once the
application is filed, the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the health group plan and must stay the bankruptcy proceedings
pending its decision.
56
Under the proposed legislation, the district court is obligated to
make the appointment "if the court determines that the trusteeship is
necessary to protect the interests of the participants and beneficiaries
or providers of medical care or to avoid any unreasonable deteriora-
tion of the financial condition of the plan."57 If appointed, the Sec-
retary would have the same duties as any Chapter 7 trustee 51 in addi-
tion to other duties as set forth in the legislation.5 9 House Bill 448 is,
however, otherwise silent as to how the insolvency case would be
administered.
Representative Charles W. Norwood, Jr.60 introduced similar
legislation, entitled the "Affordable Health Care Act of 1999,,,61 on
52. Among other things, this lengthy legislation provides for: unrestricted
access to certain medical care, grievance procedures, patient access to infor-
mation, and limits patients' damages in the event of litigation.
53. Section 810 is found in Section 1302(a) of House Bill 448 and amends
subtitle B of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
54. H.R. 448 § 1302(a) (adding section 810(a) to subtitle B of Title I of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
55. See id. (adding section 810(e) to subtitle B of Title I of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
56. See id. (adding section 810(f)(1) to subtitle B of Title I of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
57. Id. (adding section 810(a) to subtitle B of Title I of the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974).
58. The duties of a Chapter 7 trustee are provided in 11 U.S.C. § 704.
59. See H.R. 448 § 1302(a) (adding section 810(d) to subtitle B of Title I of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
60. Charles Norwood is a Republican Representative from Georgia.
61. H.R. 1136, 106th Cong. (1999).
1052
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March 16, 1999. House Bill 1136, among other things,62 seeks to
provide affordable health care through the creation of association
health plans.63 House Bill 1136 provides that whenever the Secre-
tary of HHS determines that an association health plan is in a finan-
cially hazardous condition, the Secretary may apply to the district
court to be appointed as the plan's trustee to administer it during the
period of its insolvency.64 The provisions in House Bill 1136 con-
cerning jurisdiction, standards for appointment, and duties of the
Secretary are identical to the provisions of House Bill 448.65 As with
House Bill 448, there are no other provisions discussing how the in-
solvency case is to be administered.
Congress is not alone in its attempts to dictate the administration
of a health care bankruptcy case. In 1998, the California legislature
added section 1421.5 to its Health and Safety Code. 66 It dictates
certain notices that must be provided to the State Department of
Health Services in the event of the commencement of a bankruptcy
case involving a long-term health care facility.67 Further, it requires
a bankruptcy trustee to comply with all state licensing and federal
certification requirements applicable to a long-term health care facil-
ity, including those governing patient rights, transfer or discharge,
and facility closings. 68 In two separate places, section 1421.5 de-
clares that the trustee must be notified when the transfer of patients
presents a compelling public health and safety risk, and that the
trustee is not exempted from complying with applicable state law
"for any reason."
69
62. House Bill 1136 also authorizes multi-employer HealthMarts, estab-
lishes refundable credits for providers of qualified health coverage, and en-
hances the availability of medical savings accounts. See id.
63. House Bill 1136 defines association health plans as group health plans
organized by trade, profession, and industry association, or by chambers of
commerce. See id. § 801.
64. See id. § 810(a).
65. See id. § 810(d)-(f).
66. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1421.5 (West Supp. 1999).
67. See id. § 1421.5(a)(1), (a)(2).
68. See id. § 1421.5(a)(3)(A).
69. Id. § 1421.5(a)(3)(B), (b)(1).
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C. Back to the Drawing Board
As suggested above, the health care bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion of the type introduced in Congress and enacted by the California
legislature reflects poor drafting. Seeking to change the Bankruptcy
Code by amending the Social Security Act as Senate Bill 255 does
defy common sense. Resorting to another federal or state law de-
stroys the textual benefit of the Bankruptcy Code as unified legisla-
tion. In addition, Senate Bill 255's waiver of the automatic stay
against "any action" would be a disaster. Further, House Bills 448
and 1136 fail to incorporate by reference those provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code necessary for a sensible liquidation.
Better crafting of the proposed amendments is not an adequate
answer to the problems raised by much of the insolvent health care
provider legislation. These efforts to amend the Bankruptcy Code, or
otherwise restrict the administration of a bankruptcy case, largely re-
flect bad policy that no amount of rewriting will cure.
IV. WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE GOVERNMENT PROTECTING ITS
COFFERS
No one doubts that Congress could redraft the Code to favor the
federal government over all other creditors. The relevant inquiry is
not whether Congress can, but whether it should. The answer should
be a resounding "No." One of the fundamental policies of bank-
ruptcy law is the equal treatment of creditors. 70 Upon the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case, creditors are compelled to halt
their individual collection efforts in favor of a collective remedy.
Implementing this important policy requires limits on the
amount and scope of priority claims.7' Notwithstanding the rare case
of a solvent estate, priority claims diminish, if not destroy, the unse-
cured creditors' distribution. Thus, the greater the number and
amount of priority claims, the more unequal the treatment of credi-
tors.
72
70. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 17 (1973).
71. Priority claims are those which must be paid in full before other unse-
cured creditors receive any distribution.
72. An equally fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Code is the ability of
1054
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What supports the federal government receiving a priority claim
in a health care bankruptcy case for Medicare overpayments? Sup-
port is not in the Bankruptcy Code itself. Indeed, the policy of the
Code seems to suggest that the government should be treated as any
other creditor except in the narrowest of circumstances. Section 106
of the Code includes governmental units73 in its definition of credi-
tors and, for the most part, provides that governmental units are to be
treated like any other creditor.74 Section 106 waives the federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity and allows its claims to be treated like
other claims, subject to avoidance, setoff, and other defenses.
75
Bankruptcy courts are specifically given the jurisdiction to enter final
orders and judgments for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive re-
lief, other than punitive damages, against the United States.
76
Although the Code gives an eighth priority for certain tax
claims,77 that priority cannot be explained solely as a governmental
protection program, which would be true for Medicare overpayment78
claims. First, priority taxes are also non-dischargeable. The
greater the distribution to the government on its priority claim, the
less the debtor will have to pay post-discharge. The Code's prefer-
ence for federal tax claims over general unsecured claims, therefore,
the honest debtor to obtain a new financial life through the discharge of unpaid
debts. This is often called a debtor's "fresh start." See H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
at 384 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6340; S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 98 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6059. Increasing the
number and scope of non-dischargeable claims, as Senate Bill 255 does for
Medicare overpayment claims, harms the fresh start in the same manner as in-
creasing priority claims does for the equal treatment of creditors.
73. The definition of a "governmental unit" includes the United States and
any state, commonwealth, district, territory, municipality, foreign state, de-
partment, agency or any instrumentality of the United States, or any other for-
eign or domestic government. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (1994).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3) (1994).
75. See id. § 106(c).
76. See id. § 106(a)(3).
77. A ninth priority is reserved to "allowed unsecured claims based upon
any commitment by the debtor" to a federal depository institution. Crime
Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4867 (1990). Like
the Medicare crisis of current days, Congress in 1990 was concerned with the
impact of the savings and loan bailout on the treasury. Its enactment suffers
from the same poor policy as a Medicare overpayment priority would suffer
today.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (1994).
1055
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:1045
benefits the competing bankruptcy policy of protecting the debtor's
fresh start.
79
One additional justification for treating tax claims differently is
that they are involuntary claims. The government does not pick and
choose who owes it taxes. It should not, therefore, be subject to the
same risk of non-payment as voluntary creditors are.80 It is unclear
why other involuntary creditors, such as tort victims, who also do not
elect to be creditors of a debtor, are not also given a priority in pay-
ment. But even if involuntariness is a valid justification, it would
have little application in the health care context because the federal
government does choose with whom to do business. In order to par-
ticipate in the Medicare program, a provider must be qualified by
HS.8 In other words, the federal government assumes a risk of
non-payment with a health care provider in the same manner any
trade creditor assumes a credit risk.
In addition to the federal government's ability to bear the loss
better than most unsecured creditors, the government already has a
powerful collection of tools to use against an insolvent health care
provider who has received Medicare overpayments. These existing
rights make the proposed legislation somewhat unnecessary. Al-
though the Code recognizes a creditor's right of setoff in all cases,
except for limited, abuse-prone situations, 2 setoff requires that the
creditor's claim and the creditor's debt both arise pre-petition.83 Yet,
in the health care arena, courts have allowed Medicare overpayments
received by a debtor pre-petition to be subtracted from payables due
to the debtor in possession by invocation of the equitable doctrine of
79. See S. 255, 106th Cong. § 9(a) (1999). While the same could be true of
Medicare overpayment claims, since Senate Bill 255 seeks to also make them
non-dischargeable, the distinction turns on the identity of the debtor. As dis-
cussed at supra note 34, dischargability is irrelevant except in a bankruptcy
case of an individual. Virtually all individual debtors are subject to tax claims.
Few individual debtors are subject to large Medicare overpayment claims.
80. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 190 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N 5963, 6150.
81. The Social Security Act requires that a health care provider meet certain
statutory criteria and file a provider agreement with HHS. See 42 U.S.C. §
1395cc(a) (Supp. V 1988).
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
83. See id. § 101(5)(B).
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recoupment. 84 In addition, it is the position of both the Fifth Circuit
and HHS that a company that purchases a medical provider's assets,
including its Medicare provider agreement, assumes liability of any
past overpayments made by HHS to the predecessor provider.
8 5
Unless a health care provider ceases operations and abandons its li-
cense, the Medicare overpayments will eventually be repaid.
Finally, there may be a place for the equitable doctrine of un-
clean hands in this controversy. At least some of the fault for the fi-
nancial turmoil in the health care industry should be laid at the feet
of the federal government.86 Projections show the Medicare Trust
Fund running out of cash in the next century. 87 To date, the govern-
ment has opted merely to pay less for the services provided, rather
than reducing benefits or beneficiaries. 88 The Balanced Budget Bill
of 1997,89 for example, reduced payments to providers by $115 bil-
lion over five years by reducing reimbursements for managed care
and reductions in hospital payments.9 Thus, it should not be sur-
prising that the number of health care insolvencies has increased by
ten to fifteen percent per year for each of the last three years.
9 1
Having caused a problem that hurts all creditors, the federal govern-
ment should not be allowed to save only itself from the damage.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Consumer Health Servs. of Am., Inc., 108
F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But see University Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re
University Med. Ctr.) 973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992). Unlike setoff, recoup-
ment is not mentioned in the Bankruptcy Code. It is a creditor's right to de-
duct a debt it owes to the debtor from a claim it has against the debtor, so long
as the reasons for the reduction arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.
See University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1079-80.
85. See United States v. Vernon Home Health, Inc., 21 F.3d 693, 695-96
(5th Cir. 1994).
86. Donna D. Fraische, The Interrelationship Between Bankruptcy and
Health Care Law, paper presented to the Chapter 11 Subcommittee of the
Business Bankruptcy Committee of the Business Section of the American Bar
Association, October 24, 1998.
87. Samuel R. Maizel, A New Look at Healthcare Restructuring, paper pre-
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V. HEALTH CARE CASES SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SPECIAL
BANKRUPTCY RESTRICTIONS
Perhaps it is inevitable that health care is the focus of Bank-
ruptcy Code revision. After all, health care has already been the
subject of substantial legislative and regulatory attention. Moreover,
this attention has only increased as a greater percentage of the federal
budget is devoted to Medicare, Medicaid, and veteran benefits pro-
grams. The United States spends more money on health care than
any other nation.92 It is not surprising that the scope of those statutes
and regulations may now extend to what happens to health care con-
cerns in bankruptcy. Perhaps health care should be treated differ-
ently from bankruptcy because it is fundamentally different. Ade-
quate health care has been declared to be a fundamental right. 93
What other industries filing for bankruptcy provide fundamental
rights?
It is also difficult for Congress and the states to not react to hor-
ror stories like health care insolvencies. For example, imagine a
cancer patient arriving at a clinic for treatment only to find the door
chained, her medical records having been thrown out by a landlord
who has retaken possession of a closed facility. Imagine receiving a
call late one night telling you that you must move your fragile
mother to a new facility by morning.
94
92. See Maizel, supra note 87, at 1.
93. See President's Remarks to the Montgomery County Community in
Norristown, Pa., 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 95 (Jan. 20, 1999).
94. The enactment of California Health and Safety Code Section 1421.5
was prompted by a bankruptcy trustee's relocation of nursing home residents
two days after his appointment. See Martha L. Willman, Bill to Bar Evictions
at Nursing Homes Okd: The Measure, Prompted by an Incident in Which Resi-
dents of a Failed Reseda Facility Were Kicked Out, Awaits Governor's Final
Signature, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at B1. Prior to the enactment of Section
1421.5, California law had required thirty days' notice before the closure of a
health facility. However, the notice requirement only applied to licensed
health care operations, but not to trustees acting in bankruptcy. Thus, the
trustee who had inherited a facility lacking food or supplies immediately or-
dered the eviction of the facility's patients. Since removing or disrupting pa-
tients in a disorderly manner potentially endangered the patients' lives, fol-
lowing California law prior to 1421.5 was more dangerous to them than a more
organized relocation would have been. See id.
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These situations are grim and cry out for a solution. However,
amending the Bankruptcy Code to dictate how they must be run is
not that solution. If a health care provider has commenced a bank-
ruptcy case, chances are that it has been in financial straits for some
time. Whether those financial straits have been caused by govern-
mental policies or not, better regulatory oversight might have pre-
vented the problem from even beginning. Likewise, oversight can
forestall difficulties from becoming so severe as to require a bank-
ruptcy filing. As discussed above, providers are often forced to file
bankruptcy because HHS has frozen their Medicare payment stream.
If HHS wants to eliminate the problem of health care providers in
bankruptcy, a more cooperative approach with the providers may be
all that is necessary.
Even if better oversight would not have prevented the bank-
ruptcy case, the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and
the Social Security Act would be unworkable solutions in Chapter 7
cases. Senate Bill 625 and California Health and Safety Code sec-
tion 1421.5 rest the whole weight of avoiding unacceptable upheaval
on bankruptcy trustees. Bankruptcy trustees are typically lawyers
and accountants without specialized health care expertise. Trustees
are charged with evaluating the services and care quality of replace-
ment facilities, determining the appropriate regulatory agency for the
storage of records, and otherwise moving patients and preserving
their records. Accomplishing these tasks is very difficult without
expertise.
Further, how is a bankruptcy trustee to perform these duties
without adequate funding? A closed facility likely has no liquid as-
sets. The receivables may be pledged to a factor or subject to a
Medicare overpayment recoupment claim. Who is going to pay for
the storage, notices and patient transfers the trustee must provide?
What trustee will accept an assignment that dictates responsibilities
but provides no means to pay for the exercise of those responsibili-
ties except out of the trustee's own pocket? The only sensible solu-
tion is making patient records and patient transfers the responsibili-
ties of the appropriate federal, state, and local agencies. The
.agencies have the expertise in health care and other related patient
matters, and the ability to spread the cost among all taxpayers.
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Some of the same problems exist with Senate Bill 625's creation
of the office of ombudsman. To have an ombudsman in a liquidation
case is meaningless. As a practical matter, by the time the ombuds-
man is appointed, the facility will have been long closed. There is no
need for a patient advocate when there are no patients. Again, who
will pay for this additional administrative layer?
There may be more justification in a Chapter 11 case, in which
the debtor is operating as a debtor in possession. However, it is dif-
ficult to understand what an ombudsman would do that we should
not expect of the regulatory agencies with oversight responsibility
for all health care providers. If we are to have federally mandated
patient advocates, then let us have them in all situations and have the
cost borne by the public as a whole rather than alone by the unse-
cured creditors of a particular health care provider.
There remains, then, Representatives Bilirakis and Norwood's
idea to allow the Secretary of HIIS to be a bankruptcy trustee. The
idea is a beneficial one in a liquidation case but the legislation is too
limiting. House Bills 448 and 1136 only concern certain types of
health plans. They should be expanded to cover all health care pro-
viders regulated by HHS. Further, since the Secretary must petition
to be appointed, the legislation is limited to those situations in which
the Secretary chooses to act. For the expertise and expense reasons
discussed above, the bills should be expanded to require the Secre-
tary to serve as a Chapter 7 trustee for all regulated health care pro-
viders in which a panel Chapter 7 trustee is unwilling to act.
Finally, House Bills 448 and 1136 should remove the district
court from the proceedings. Bankruptcy courts are far more experi-
enced in ascertaining the circumstances in which a trustee should be
appointed as well as all other matters relevant to the liquidation or
reorganization of an enterprise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Successful legislation affecting health care bankruptcies is all
but certain in the 106th Congress. The sheer number of bills left at
the end of the last Congress, coupled with the bills introduced in the
early days of the first session of the 106th Congress, make the clos-
ing of another Congress without substantial Bankruptcy Code
amendments unlikely. Unfortunately, health care bankruptcy cases
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and health care fraud are inextricably linked in the minds of Con-
gress.
But, if Congress can refrain from overreacting to abuse cases, all
need not necessarily be lost to bankruptcy purists. Congress should
preserve the fundamental policies of equal treatment of creditors, as
well as preserve a debtor's fresh start, and recognize that bankruptcy
trustees have neither the expertise nor the financing to solve the
problems of a financially destroyed health care provider and its pa-
tients. With the understanding that better inspections, oversight, and
cooperation of those with the expertise and resources can eliminate
the problems encountered, the integrity and the benefits of the Bank-
ruptcy Code will be better preserved.
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